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Our knowledge grows as we integrate events experienced at different points in time. We
may or may not become aware of events, their integration, and their impact on our knowl-
edge and decisions. But can we mentally integrate two events, if they are experienced
at different time points and at different levels of consciousness? In this study, an event
consisted of the presentation of two unrelated words. In the stream of events, half of
events shared one component (“tree desk” . . . “desk fish”) to facilitate event integration.
We manipulated the amount of time and trials that separated two corresponding events.
The contents of one event were presented subliminally (invisible) and the contents of the
corresponding overlapping event supraliminally (visible). Hence, event integration required
the binding of contents between consciousness levels and between time points. At the
final test of integration, participants judged whether two supraliminal test words (“tree
fish”) fit together semantically or not. Unbeknown to participants, half of test words were
episodically related through an overlap (“desk”; experimental condition) and half were
not (control condition). Participants judged episodically related test words to be closer
semantically than unrelated test words.This subjective decrease in the semantic distance
between test words was both independent of whether the invisible event was encoded
first or second in order and independent of the number of trials and the time that separated
two corresponding events. Hence, conscious and unconscious memories were mentally
integrated into a linked mnemonic representation.
Keywords: episodic memory, unconscious, masking, subliminal, associations, flexibility, compositionality, memory
systems
INTRODUCTION
No event equals another event. But events may share aspects such
as a person or an item in the scene. Such commonalities between
events help us to bridge events, to integrate information from
events, and to make inferences that guide our choices in new sit-
uations. We are usually aware of the events that we experience.
But the act of our mental integration of memories of several
events and its impact on our choices and behaviors may escape
our awareness. While most past experiments aimed at investigat-
ing memory for single, discrete events, there is mounting evidence
that (conscious) memories of multiple events are integrated into
networks, which form the basis of inference (Heckers et al., 2004;
Preston et al., 2004; Smith and Squire, 2005; Shohamy and Wag-
ner, 2008; Zeithamova and Preston, 2010; Zeithamova et al., 2012).
In some experiments, integration and inference were unconscious
but the encoding of events was conscious (Greene et al., 2001, 2006;
Leo and Greene, 2008). In other experiments, all mental processes
were unconscious, namely the processing of subliminal (invisi-
ble) events, their mental integration, and resulting inference as
measured behaviorally in a test situation (Reber and Henke, 2012;
Reber et al., 2012).
Neuroimaging studies in volunteers showed that the hippocam-
pus, a brain structure that is crucial for episodic memory (Tulving,
2002; Squire, 2004), was activated when overlapping events (i.e.,
events with common components) were experienced and/or when
inferences were made in the test situation (Heckers et al., 2004; Pre-
ston et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2006; Shohamy and Wagner, 2008;
Zeithamova and Preston, 2010; Reber et al., 2012; Zeithamova
et al., 2012). Importantly, the hippocampus assisted these mental
operations even when they occurred outside conscious awareness
(Reber et al., 2012).
A fundamental question concerns whether and how conscious
and unconscious memories interact. We ask whether the mental
integration of discrete events is possible if consciousness divides
between events. This may happen if a first event is experienced
consciously, while a second event is experienced unconsciously; or
vice versa. We hypothesized that two discrete, overlapping events
can be bridged through integration of memory traces across con-
sciousness levels because evidence indicates that memories of
unconsciously and consciously experienced events are laid down
in the same memory system, namely the hippocampus and related
cortices (Henke et al., 2003; Degonda et al., 2005; Reber et al.,
2012). Hence interactions between conscious and unconscious
memory traces in this study are thought to occur within the
same memory system and not between different memory sys-
tems. Earlier reports of implicit-explicit interactions concerned
psychologically and neuroanatomically separate memory systems
that either cooperated or competed in the process of learning a
material or a certain procedure (Wagner et al., 2000; Poldrack
et al., 2001; Voermans et al., 2004; Moses et al., 2010). Here,
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we study implicit-explicit interactions within a single memory
system, namely episodic memory or the medial temporal lobe
memory system, whose output is either accessible or inaccessible
to conscious awareness depending on the input – subliminal ver-
sus supraliminal. We expect conscious and unconscious memory
representations to be integrated into a cohesive memory space that
guides choices in a test situation.
An event was operationalized as the visual presentation of
two unrelated words, such as “tree desk.” In the case of “uncon-
scious events,”word pairs were presented subliminal, i.e., for 17 ms
and flanked by pattern masks. In the case of “conscious events,”
word pairs were presented supraliminal (visible). Half of word
pairs shared one word, e.g., “tree desk” and “desk fish,” and were
therefore overlapping (experimental condition). The other half of
word pairs was non-overlapping because they shared no words
(control condition) (Figure 1). To examine whether integration
success is modulated by intervening time and trials, we varied
the number of word pairs that intervened two overlapping word
pairs by presenting 1, 5, 9, or 13 word pairs in-between. Of the
two corresponding word pairs, the first was presented sublimi-
nal and the second supraliminal to half of participants, reversed
for the other half of participants. We hypothesized that over-
lapping events would be integrated across consciousness levels
irrespective of whether the first or the second event was processed
consciously. Either way, a successful integration of word pairs
across events and across consciousness levels presupposes that
within-event associations be established. The test of integration
was given 1 min following encoding. This test required participants
to judge whether two supraliminal words fit together semanti-
cally or not. The two test words were either unrelated (control
condition) or episodically related (e.g., “tree fish”) through two
distinct events (“tree desk”. . . “desk fish”) that shared one word
(experimental condition) (Figure 1). Words in test pairs of both
conditions had been seen during encoding; one word with and the
other word without consciousness. The only difference between
conditions was the unconscious episodic link between test words.
The mental integration of overlapping events was expected to
change the speed of participants’ decisions and/or the outcome
FIGURE 1 | Design. An event consisted of the presentation of two unrelated
words. Participants experienced two overlapping (experimental condition;
overlap indicated in red) or non-overlapping (control condition) encoding
events. The temporal distance and amount of distraction given between two
corresponding overlapping and non-overlapping events was varied in four
levels with 1, 5, 9, or 13 word pairs presented in-between. Depending on the
group assignment, either the first or the second encoding event was
presented subliminal for unconscious encoding. The subliminal presentation
mode is graphically illustrated by forward and backward pattern masks. We
refer to overlapping word pairs presented in the experimental condition as
A–B and B–C and to non-overlapping word pairs presented in the control
condition as a–b, c–d. Words in test events were presented supraliminal. A
and C words from the two encoding events were re-presented at test to
induce the retrieval of the common counterpart (B) in the experimental
condition. In the control condition, a and d words were re-presented at test,
each of which could activate its respective counterpart (b or c), but no
common counterpart. Hence retrieval words given in the control condition
were not episodically related by a word that was part of both encoding events.
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of their decisions at test (Reber and Henke, 2012; Reber et al.,
2012).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Sixty students participated in the study (age: 19–35 years,
M = 22.95, SD= 3.10; 40 women; six left-handers). At the point of
testing, all participants had already 12 years of education. Exclu-
sion criteria were a native language other than German, subopti-
mal visual acuity, a history of neurological or psychiatric disorders,
and the consumption of legal or illegal drugs. Participants were
kept naïve regarding the study purpose and the presentation of
subliminal stimuli. We misinformed participants initially that we
investigated attention and word processing alone, but participants
were fully debriefed following the main experiment. The study was
approved by the local ethics committee.
MATERIALS AND DESIGN
The 384 German nouns of the main experiment were arranged to
192 semantically unrelated pairs that we presented to participants
for conscious and unconscious encoding. These 192 word pairs
were divided into two stimulus lists: one list was used for the
experimental and the other for the control condition (96 word
pairs per list/condition). Word overlaps were introduced in 48
couples of pairs (short hand: A–B, B–C; Figure 1) in list 1,
which half of participants received for integrative encoding in
their experimental condition. This half of participants received the
96 non-overlapping word pairs (short hand: a–b, c–d; Figure 1)
of list 2 for non-integrative encoding in their control condi-
tion. The other half of participants received list 1 in the control
condition and list 2 in the experimental condition. Accordingly,
word overlaps were introduced in the 48 couples of pairs in
list 2 for integrative encoding, while word pairs in list 1 were
left non-overlapping. Importantly, all participants received the
same word pairs for retrieval, counterbalanced between condi-
tions. Hence, words in a given retrieval word pair were episod-
ically related for half of participants (experimental condition)
but unrelated for the other half of participants (control condi-
tion). Retrieval word pairs in both conditions consisted of the
left-hand word of the first encoding word pair followed by the
right-hand word of the corresponding second encoding word
pair.
Stimuli of the experimental and the control condition were
assigned to 12 sets that were used in 12 encoding-retrieval runs
(Figure 2). Each run contained eight overlapping encoding word
pairs in the experimental condition (A–B, B–C), eight non-
overlapping encoding word pairs in the control condition (a–b,
c–d), and four retrieval word pairs both in the experimental con-
dition (A–C) and the control condition (a–d). The assignment
of the 12 stimulus sets to runs was random. The practice run
given before the main experiment was designed identical to the 12
experimental runs.
APPARATUS
The experiment took place in a dark room. A digital light pro-
cessing (DLPTM) video beamer with a refresh rate of 60 Hertz
projected the stimuli on a white screen positioned 2 m in front
of the participant. The participant sat in a chair with his/her
head fixated on a chin rest. The stimulated visual field spanned
10 (height)× 13 (width) degrees. For stimulus presentation we
used the software Presentation ®(http://www.neurobs.com/). All
responses were recorded with a standard computer mouse.
PROCEDURE
Encoding
The first encoding word pair was presented subliminal and the
corresponding second word pair supraliminal for half of partici-
pants (“unconscious→ conscious group”) and vice versa for the
other half of participants (“conscious→ unconscious group”) (see
Figure 2). If word pairs appeared supraliminal (presentation dura-
tion: 3.5 s; inter-stimulus interval: 1 s), participants decided for
each pair whether the two words fit together semantically or not
(fit/don’t fit task). This task invokes mental comparison processes
that provide for incidental paired-associative semantic encoding of
words. Because words in pairs were not closely associated semanti-
cally, participants were encouraged to relax their response criterion
to arrive at about 50% fit responses. Participants were informed
that closely related words such as “needle – yarn” would not be
presented. Instead, word pairs such as “cow – grill” would be pre-
sented. Although such words are rather remote semantically, they
may still elicit a “fit” answer because beef for example is a popular
sort of meat for barbecues.
When word pairs were subliminal, participants perceived a
flickering stream of pattern masks and simultaneously performed
an attention task on images that were embedded in the sequence
of subliminal words and pattern masks. We used the masking par-
adigm of our previous studies on subliminal encoding (Degonda
et al., 2005; Duss et al., 2011; Reber and Henke, 2011, 2012; Reber
et al., 2012; see “Subliminal Stimulus Presentation and Atten-
tion Task”). An instruction slide presented before the block of
eight subliminal encoding pairs and the block of eight supral-
iminal encoding pairs prepared participants for their up-coming
task (Figure 2). Time and trials between two corresponding word
pairs were manipulated; we presented 1, 5, 9, or 13 word pairs
in-between two corresponding encoding word pairs (Figure 2).
Word pairs were randomly assigned to interval levels. Following
encoding, participants took a 1-min break that served as a mini
consolidation phase.
Retrieval
To test for relational integration, we presented four retrieval pairs
in each condition. The order of these eight pairs was randomly
generated for each participant and each run. Retrieval word pairs
were presented in the same fashion (presentation duration: 3.5 s;
inter-stimulus interval: 1 s) and with the same task (fit/don’t fit
task) as supraliminal encoding word pairs.
Subliminal stimulus presentation and attention task
We used the masking paradigm of our previous studies on sublim-
inal encoding (Degonda et al., 2005; Duss et al., 2011; Reber and
Henke, 2011, 2012; Reber et al., 2012). Each encoding word pair
was flashed 12 times for 17 ms within a time window of 6 s that
constituted one encoding trial. Word pairs were flanked by black
and white dot pattern masks that were presented for 183 ms. In this
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FIGURE 2 | Experimental procedure. The experiment consisted of 12
encoding-test runs. Here, we illustrate the procedure of one run. For the
unconscious→ conscious group (left-hand upper panel), the first encoding
word pair (A–B and a–b) was presented subliminally (illustrated by the visual
noise background) and the second, corresponding encoding word pair
supraliminally (B–C and c–d). This order was reversed for the
conscious→unconscious group of participants (right-hand upper panel).
Corresponding encoding word pairs were overlapping in the experimental
condition (A–B, B–C; overlaps depicted in red) and non-overlapping in the
control condition (a–b, c–d). The distance between two corresponding
encoding word pairs was varied fourfold with 1, 5, 9, or 13 intervening word
pairs. The four distance levels are highlighted with color-coded arrows and
color-coded image-frames. The same distances applied to the procedure in
the conscious→unconscious group (arrows are omitted in right-hand panel).
A break of 1 min separated encoding and test. Test trials of the experimental
and the control condition were presented in random order and with
supraliminal duration for participants in both groups. Both in supraliminal
encoding and supraliminal test trials, participants decided whether the two
words of a pair fit together semantically or not. During subliminal trials,
participants performed an attention task.
stream of subliminal word pairs and pattern masks, we embedded
an attention task for participants to stay focused and direct gaze at
the screen center. The attention task required participants to fixate
a repeatedly flashed central fixation cross and to indicate when
the fixation cross was replaced by a horizontal or vertical line seg-
ment (push left or right key, respectively). The fixation cross was
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presented for 233 ms at a rate of one Hertz. The fixation cross
was replaced only once by a line segment at a random time point
within the 6-s time window that constituted a trial.
TEST OF AWARENESS
Following the main experiment, participants underwent a struc-
tured interview to find out whether they had noticed or sus-
pected the presence of subliminal stimuli in the experiment.
Next, participants were informed of subliminal word pairs in
the experiment. Finally, they took an objective awareness test
to assess their ability to consciously discern subliminal word
pairs or fragments thereof. Participants were instructed to try
to discern a subliminal word pair and to match it to a subse-
quently presented identical or different word pair on a trial-by-trial
basis. While instructions in the main experiment were indirect
not alluding to subliminal word pairs, instructions in the test
of awareness were direct. Direct tests are predominantly sensi-
tive to conscious rather than unconscious processes (Reingold
and Merikle, 1988; Snodgrass and Shevrin, 2006) and therefore
yield a measure of conscious access to subliminal stimuli. Indi-
rect tests are predominantly sensitive to unconscious rather than
conscious processes. We aimed at indirectly measured effects of
unconscious processing with no directly measured effects of con-
scious word detection (Reingold and Merikle, 1988; Greenwald
et al., 1995). The test of awareness was different for the two
experimental groups because subliminal words (B words in B–
C pairs) were primed by previously perceived supraliminal words
(A–B pairs) in the conscious→ unconscious group but not the
unconscious→ conscious group.
Test of awareness for the unconscious→ conscious group
The test of awareness included 96 trials. Each trial consisted of the
subliminal presentation of one word pair followed by the supral-
iminal presentation of either the same or a different word pair
(Figure 3). The masking paradigm and psychophysical conditions
applied in the main experiment were again applied in the test of
awareness. Participants were instructed to attend to the sublimi-
nal presentation of a word pair, while doing the attention task, and
then to indicate by button press whether the subsequently pre-
sented visible word pair corresponded to the subliminal word pair
(target) or not (distractor). Supraliminal targets and distractors
stayed on the screen till participants responded. The probability
of targets was 50%.
Test of awareness for the conscious→ unconscious group
This awareness test included 96 trials as well, but these trials
were divided into six runs that each contained 16 subliminal-
supraliminal test trials. As in this group’s main experiment, each
run started off with the supraliminal presentation of eight A–B
word pairs for participants to decide whether words in a pair fit
together or not (fit/don’t fit task). This preactivation was followed
by the 16 subliminal-supraliminal test trials. The presentation
order of the 16 trials was randomized. Eight of the 16 trials
contained subliminal pairs with a primed B word (B–C trials)
FIGURE 3 | Design of the test of awareness. Following the main
experiment, participants took an objective awareness test to assess their
ability to consciously discern subliminal word pairs or fragments thereof.
Participants were instructed to try to discern a subliminal word pair and to
match it to a subsequently presented identical (target) or different (distractor)
word pair on a trial-by-trial basis. The test of awareness was different for the
two experimental groups because subliminal words (B words in B–C pairs)
were primed by previously perceived supraliminal words (A–B pairs) in the
conscious→unconscious group (bottom panel) but not the
unconscious→ conscious group (top panel). t, time.
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and eight trials contained subliminal pairs with unprimed words
(Figure 3). Each of the subliminally presented word pairs was
immediately followed by a supraliminal word pair (target or dis-
tractor) for participants to indicate by button press whether the
visible word pair was identical to the subliminal word pair or
not. In trials where subliminal word pairs were unprimed, tar-
gets were equal to subliminal words and distracters differed (as
for the unconscious→ conscious group). However, in trials where
the first word in a subliminal pair was primed (e.g., apple), targets
were equal to subliminal words, while distractors were composed
of the same first word (e.g., apple) plus a second new word (e.g.,
park) (Figure 3). Hence, both targets and distractors contained
the primed word (e.g., apple). This circumstance allowed us to
test only for the perceptual processing of subliminal new words
that were presented besides the primed words in pairs. Hence,
with this procedure we could not test for a perceptual advantage
of the primed words contained in subliminal pairs. Even if only the
targets, but not the distractors, would contain a primed word (e.g.,
apple), participants’ selections would still fail to indicate whether
the subliminal processing of primed words is facilitated because
the absence versus presence of a previously seen (during preacti-
vation) and probably remembered word would skew selections in
favor of targets.
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
For the analysis of performance accuracy at test, we computed the
rate of each participant’s fit responses to A–C pairs (experimental
condition) and to a–d pairs (control condition) by dividing the
total of fit responses by the respective total of given responses. The
rate of fit responses was also computed for each encoding interval
(1, 5, 9, or 13 word pairs between two corresponding encoding
word pairs; see Figure 2). Trials with RTs below 500 ms were
excluded. Rates of fit responses were analyzed in an ANOVA with
the two within-subjects factors Condition (experimental versus
control condition) and Encoding Interval (1, 5, 9, or 13 interven-
ing word pairs) and the between-subjects factor Encoding Order
(unconscious→ conscious versus conscious→ unconscious). For
the analysis of reaction latency, RTs of fit and don’t fit responses
were z-transformed with respect to the RT distribution of each
participant. RTs with z-values deviating more than 2 SDs from
a participant’s mean were excluded. We computed each partici-
pant’s mean RT for A–C pairs (experimental condition) and a–d
pairs (control condition) and per encoding interval. Mean RTs
were analyzed in an ANOVA that included the same factors as the
ANOVA used for the accuracy data (rate of fit responses).
We also computed mean RTs of fit and don’t fit responses to
supraliminal encoding word pairs. For participants of the con-
scious→ unconscious group, supraliminal encoding word pairs
were A–B and a–b word pairs. For participants of the uncon-
scious→ conscious group, supraliminal encoding word pairs were
B–C and c–d word pairs. Differences in mean RT between condi-
tions were tested for significance with a paired-samples t -test.
RESULTS
TEST OF AWARENESS: PERFORMANCE AT CHANCE LEVEL
As in the main experiment, trials with RTs below 500 ms were
excluded from the analysis. Rates of correct answers (hits plus
correct rejections) in the test of awareness deviated from chance
performance (0.50) neither in the unconscious→ conscious
group [M ± SE= 0.51± 0.01; t (29)= 0.969, p= 0.341; 96 trials]
nor the conscious→ unconscious group [M ± SE= 0.50± 0.01;
t (29)=−0.407,p= 0.687; 96 trials]. Discrimination performance
in the latter group remained at chance level, when preactivation
trials [M ± SE= 0.49± 0.01; t (29)=−0.601, p= 0.553] and tri-
als without preactivation [M ± SE= 0.50± 0.01; t (29)= 0.158,
p= 0.876] were analyzed separately.
Binomial tests computed for every participant revealed that two
of the 60 participants yielded a relatively good discrimination per-
formance that reached a probability of 10% or lower (one-tailed)
to be obtained by chance alone. Furthermore, one participant
reported to have consciously perceived subliminal letters during
the main experiment. However, this person’s performance in the
test of awareness was at chance level. We decided to exclude these
three participants from the analysis of the data from the main
experiment. Accordingly, 28 participants remained in the uncon-
scious→ conscious group and 29 in the conscious→ unconscious
group.
CONSCIOUS AND UNCONSCIOUS ENCODING OF EVENTS
Good accuracy on the attention task
Performance accuracy on the attention task given during sublim-
inal trials was good and did not differ between the two experi-
mental groups [t (37.956)=−0.982, p= 0.332, adjusted degrees
of freedom because equality of variances was not assumed]. The
unconscious→ conscious group yielded a hit rate of 0.88± 0.02
(M ± SE) and the conscious→ unconscious group of 0.90± 0.01
(M ± SE).
Subliminal B words in A–B pairs primed supraliminal B words in
B–C pairs
As a consequence of the encoding of subliminal A–B pairs in the
unconscious→ conscious group,we expected a facilitated process-
ing (priming) in the experimental condition, where B words were
repeated in supraliminal B–C pairs. A premise of B word priming is
a compositional rather than unitized representation of B words in
A–B and B–C pairs. A compositional mental representation allows
both for the reactivation of each individual part in a representa-
tion (A; B) and the reactivation of the complete representation
(A–B). A unitized mental representation, however, would require
the repeated visual presentation of the complete initial word
pair (A–B), not just the B word, to trigger a reactivation of the
previously formed A–B representation. Our data spoke for a com-
positional representation of subliminal A–B pairs. Responses to
supraliminal B–C pairs were faster (M ± SE= 2106± 71 ms) than
responses to supraliminal c–d pairs (M ± SE= 2163± 78 ms)
[t (27)= 3.502, p= 0.002, r2= 0.312]. The absence of a cor-
responding difference in the processing speed of supralimi-
nal A–B (M ± SE= 2138± 68 ms) versus supraliminal a–b pairs
(M ± SE= 2147± 65 ms) [t (28)= 0.440, p= 0.663] in the con-
scious→ unconscious group substantiates the interpretation in
terms of priming.
TEST PERFORMANCE: SUCCESSFUL INTEGRATION OF EVENTS
We computed an ANOVA with the two within-subjects factors
Condition and Encoding Interval as well as the between-subjects
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factor Encoding Order. The dependent variable was the rate of
fit responses given at test. This ANOVA yielded a significant main
effect of Condition (Figure 4). Participants gave more fit responses
to episodically related A–C pairs (M ± SE= 0.38± 0.02) ver-
sus unrelated a–d pairs (M ± SE= 0.36± 0.02), F(1,55)= 5.310,
p= 0.025, η2partial = 0.088. This effect of Condition interacted
neither with Encoding Interval [F(3,165)= 0.011, p= 0.999] nor
with Encoding Order [F(1,55)= 0.263, p= 0.610]. There was no
main effect of Encoding Interval [F(3,165)= 0.234, p= 0.872],
no significant interaction of Encoding Interval with Encoding
Order [F(3,165)= 1.156, p= 0.328], and no three-way interac-
tion of Condition with Encoding Interval and Encoding Order
[F(3,165)= 0.379, p= 0.768]. The means (±SE) of the rate
of fit responses were almost identical between encoding inter-
vals (1 pair, 5 pairs, 9 pairs, 13 pairs) both for the exper-
imental condition (M 1pair= 0.38± 0.03; M 5pairs= 0.38± 0.02;
M 9pairs= 0.38± 0.02; M 13pairs= 0.40± 0.02) and the control
condition (M 1pair= 0.36± 0.02; M 5pairs= 0.36± 0.02; M 9pairs=
0.36± 0.02; M 13pairs= 0.37± 0.03). However, the between-
subjects factor Encoding Order reached significance [F(1,55)=
5.294, p= 0.025, η2partial = 0.088]. A potential reason
for this main effect might be the unconscious→ conscious
group’s criterion for generating fit responses, which might be
looser yielding more fit responses (M ± SE= 0.41± 0.02) than
the conscious→ unconscious group (M ± SE= 0.34± 0.02). In
support of this interpretation, the unconscious→ conscious
group also generated more fit responses during supralim-
inal encoding (B–C and c–d pairs; M ± SE= 0.45± 0.02)
than the conscious→ unconscious group (A–B and a–b pairs;
M ± SE= 0.36± 0.02) [t (52.605)= 3.256, p= 0.002, r2= 0.167,
adjusted degrees of freedom because equality of variances was not
assumed].
Reaction latencies at test were comparable between
the experimental (A–C; M ± SE= 1942± 46 ms) and the
control condition [a–d; M ± SE= 1952± 45 ms; t (56)= 0.854,
p= 0.397]. This absence of an integration effect on reaction speed
was also reflected in the non-significance of all results of an
ANOVA that included the same factors as the ANOVA on the rates
of fit responses (all Fs< 2.469, all ps> 0.122). Hence, the mental
integration of events across levels of consciousness influenced the
type but not the speed of responses given at test.
CONSCIOUS WORD DISCRIMINATION DID NOT ASSIST THE
UNCONSCIOUS INTEGRATION OF EVENTS
Using the regression method described by Greenwald et al.
(1995), we found that discrimination performance in the test of
awareness [(hits+ correct rejections)− (false alarms+misses)]
was not significantly associated with the increase in the rate
of fit responses given to episodically related versus unrelated
test words [B=−0.314± 0.184, β=−0.224, t (55)=−1.705,
p= 0.094; N = 57]. However, the y-axis intercept in this regres-
sion was significantly larger than zero [intercept= 0.023± 0.010;
t (55)= 2.309, p= 0.025, r2= 0.088]. This indicates that the
unconscious integration of events was significant, when dis-
crimination performance in the test of awareness was zero
(Figure 4).
DISCUSSION
We asked whether the mental integration of discontiguous events
is possible if consciousness divides between events because one
event is experienced consciously and the other unconsciously. An
event was operationalized as the visual presentation of two unre-
lated words that were either presented supraliminal for conscious
inspection or subliminal for unconscious processing. At the test
FIGURE 4 | Results. Left-hand panel: at the test of integration across
consciousness levels, participants gave more fit answers in the experimental
than the control condition (*p<0.05; M, mean; SE, standard error of the
mean). Subliminal and supraliminal encoding word pairs had shared a word in
the experimental condition, which lent these word pairs to integration that
manifested in biased semantic decisions at test (more fit responses).
Right-hand panel: using the regression method of Greenwald et al. (1995), we
regressed the discrimination performance in the test of awareness
[(hits+ correct rejections)− (false alarms+misses)] onto the rate of fit
responses given to episodically related (experimental condition) minus
unrelated (control condition) test words. The y -axis intercept was significantly
greater than zero. This indicates that the integration of events across
consciousness levels was significant, when conscious discrimination
performance was zero.
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of integration, we presented a word from the unconscious event
besides a word from the corresponding conscious event in both
the experimental and the control condition. These test words
were semantically unrelated. But test words in the experimental
condition were episodically related by a word (not present in the
test trial) that had been the counterpart of each of the test words
drawn from the two encoding events. Test words in the control
condition were episodically unrelated. Episodically related versus
unrelated test words were more often judged as closely related
semantically. It thus appears that episodic associations intruded
into judgments of semantic distance leading to more fit responses
in the experimental versus the control condition. This effect is
known from studies with supraliminal stimulus presentations:
two unrelated words that had been presented in the same encod-
ing context and were episodically (but not semantically) related,
appeared closer semantically than words that had not been pre-
sented in the same encoding context; or they appeared equally
close as words that were related semantically (McKoon and Rat-
cliff, 1979, 1986; Dosher and Rosedale, 1991; Patterson et al.,
2009; Coane and Balota, 2011). This line of research suggests that
connections between mental representations or between nods in
the semantic network, which have been co-activated in the same
encoding context, acquire a greater linkage strength leading to the
impression of stronger conceptual relatedness. The co-occurrence
of concepts in naturalistic events is indeed one way how the
semantic system may be dynamically (re)organized throughout
life (Coane and Balota, 2011). Although test words in the present
experimental condition had not occurred in the same encoding
context but in two different encoding contexts, they were linked
by a third word that was presented in both encoding contexts.
This mediated linkage between test words had apparently sufficed
to decrease the perceived semantic distance between test words.
Remarkably, this was possible with one of the two events processed
outside consciousness.
Do these modifications in participants’ semantic systems result
from plastic chances in the neocortex alone or from additional
plastic changes in the medial temporal lobe, particularly the hip-
pocampus? The hippocampus is ordinarily assisting the rapid
encoding of events by association formation between co-activated
areas of the neocortex (Teyler and DiScenna, 1986; Treves and
Rolls, 1994). Our task structure and results speak to a hippocampal
role because encoding was rapid (one-trial) and memory rep-
resentations must have been compositional and flexible (Cohen
and Eichenbaum, 1993; Henke, 2010). There was no neuroimag-
ing in the present study but earlier neuroimaging studies give
a clue. Reber et al. (2012) used a similar design but presented
all encoding events subliminally. There was hippocampal acti-
vation during the unconscious encoding of overlapping events
and during judgments of semantic distance made on episodi-
cally related word pairs presented at test. Moreover, hippocampal
activity measured during the encoding of overlapping sublim-
inal events predicted judgments of semantic distance at test.
The hippocampus was also activated in studies using supralim-
inal stimuli, either at the time when overlapping events were
encoded or when inferences were made at test (Heckers et al.,
2004; Preston et al., 2004; Greene et al., 2006; Shohamy and
Wagner, 2008; Zeithamova and Preston, 2010; Zeithamova et al.,
2012). Because the hippocampus played a role both in stud-
ies of inference that used supraliminal encoding events and in
a study that used subliminal encoding events, we assume that
the hippocampus is also engaged when encoding events were
both conscious and unconscious. Increasing evidence suggests
that the hippocampus engages in all tasks that require the rapid
encoding of new, compositional, and flexible associations irrespec-
tive of the level of consciousness of stimulus processing (Henke,
2010).
The absence of an effect of time/stimuli between two overlap-
ping encoding events on test performance replicates our previous
result of the successful integration of two discrete subliminal
events, which was also unaffected by intervening time/stimuli
(Reber and Henke, 2012). The lack of a temporal distance effect
in these two experiments is intriguing given previous evidence
that temporal contiguity influences the retrieval from episodic
memory (Temporal Context Model; Howard and Kahana, 1999;
Howard et al., 2005). Core assumptions of the Temporal Con-
text Model entail context-representations that change gradually
over time and that act as retrieval cues for the items learned in
the same contexts. Because items that are learned in close tem-
poral proximity have similar contexts, they are more likely to be
recalled (Howard and Kahana, 1999). If an encoding item is shown
twice to boost learning, the context of its second presentation
will resemble the context of its first presentation due to its pres-
ence at both moments in time. In our study, B words must have
induced contiguity between the two overlapping encoding events
A–B and B–C. The presence of B words in both encoding events
may have rendered the two events more independent of their tem-
poral (dis)contiguity (Howard et al., 2005). In other words, the
configurational contiguity induced by the presence of B words in
both overlapping events may have anchored and linked the two
events to the extent of neutralizing potential adverse effects of
temporal discontiguity (and interfering information) presented
between overlapping events (Howard et al., 2005).
The current design does not allow pinning down the time point
at which the integration of conscious and unconscious memories
took place – at encoding or test. Either way, representations of
unconscious events must have been solid and stable over time
because test performance was not modulated by whether the
unconscious event was preceding or following the correspond-
ing conscious event. Hence, conscious and unconscious memory
traces could be integrated independently of the order, in which
the memory traces were formed. If integration of memory traces
occurred at test, it may have been advantageous to encode the
conscious event first because consciously acquired memories are
stronger and decay not as rapidly as unconsciously acquired mem-
ories; after all, the time interval between the first event and the final
test was as long as 170 s. Under the assumption that memories
are integrated at retrieval, the lack of an order effect means that
conscious and unconscious memories outlasted this time period
equally well. If participants integrated memories already when the
second encoding event was presented, the first memory trace had
to outlast 7–72 s, which was certainly the case for both unconscious
and conscious memories. The absence of an order effect addition-
ally suggests that it was not easier to link an unconscious (weak)
representation to a pre-existing conscious (strong) representation
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than vice versa. Hence, for these time intervals, the lack of an order
effect suggests that unconscious memories were on a par with
conscious memories regarding their endurance and flexibility.
We had hypothesized that conscious and unconscious mem-
ory representations could be integrated into a cohesive memory
space assuming that the same memory system supports the encod-
ing of subliminal and supraliminal events (Henke et al., 2003;
Degonda et al., 2005; Reber et al., 2012). Yet, such harmonious
interactions between explicit and implicit memory may not have
been expected given past evidence of dissociations and compet-
ing interactions between implicit and explicit memory (Wagner
et al., 2000; Poldrack et al., 2001). Such adverse interactions con-
cerned separate memory systems (hippocampal interactions with
other structures) that competed in the process of learning the same
kind of material or procedure. Our study, however, concerned the
encoding of distinct events by the same memory system that works
at two different levels of intensity – conscious and unconscious.
Furthermore, the information acquired in the first and the sec-
ond overlapping event was neither identical nor conflicting (as in
Degonda et al., 2005) but additive, which may have contributed to
the smooth integration of information across consciousness levels.
Given that events can be encoded with and without conscious-
ness by way of the hippocampus and related cortices (Henke
et al., 2003; Degonda et al., 2005; Henke, 2010; Reber et al.,
2012), the organization of consciously and unconsciously acquired
information into a single, cohesive hippocampal memory space
appears more economic than the organization of information in
two discrete hippocampal memory spaces divided by conscious-
ness. Linked episodic knowledge – conscious or unconscious –
informs and guides us better through life than episodic knowl-
edge segmented into levels of representation. Moreover, the level
of representation of episodic knowledge is dynamic and shifts
over time. A single hippocampal memory space maintains the
stability and coherence of its organization when episodic mem-
ories shift from unconscious to conscious (Fischer et al., 2006;
Drosopoulos et al., 2011; Yordanova et al., 2012) or from con-
scious to unconscious in the course of consolidation (Saletin et al.,
2011).
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